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Introduction 
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime was 
a major development in the international law of 
the sea, emerging from the Third UN Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that 
culminated in the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).1 Military activities in 
the EEZ were a controversial issue at UNCLOS 
III and continue to be so in state practice. Some 
coastal states claim that other states cannot carry 
out military activities in or over their EEZs 
without their consent, and have sought to apply 
restrictions on navigation and overflight in their 
EEZs that are not accepted by other states. 
The issues involved have become particularly 
contentious in the Asia-Pacific region where 
there has been a series of incidents and disputes 
that might have spiralled out of control into open 
conflict. With the aims of clarifying the rights 
and duties of both coastal states and user states in 
an EEZ, and of providing an important regional 
maritime confidence and security building 
measure (MCSBM), a group of senior officials, 
legal experts and maritime specialists (now 
known as the EEZ Group 21) has been meeting 
in the region to address relevant issues.2 The 
meetings were sponsored primarily by the Ship 
and Ocean Foundation of Japan (now the Ocean 
Policy Research Foundation)3 with the objective 
of producing a set of non-binding, voluntary 
principles (‘Guidelines’), which would provide 
the basis for a common understanding and 
approach to issues arising from the 
implementation of the EEZ regime. 
The last meeting of the EEZ Group 21 held in 
Tokyo 15-16 September 2005 reached agreement 
on ‘Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone’. The proposed 
Guidelines are non-binding in nature. They set 
out broad principles of common understanding 
regarding certain aspects of navigation and 
overflight in the EEZ, including military and 
intelligence gathering activities, but do not create 
legally binding obligations between states. In 
keeping with their non-binding nature, the 
Guidelines are framed in exhortatory rather than 
obligatory language. They may be generally 
regarded as reflecting the need for better 
understanding of the rights and obligations of 
states conducting activities in the EEZ of another 
country. They represent a consensus among the 
Group 21 members on issues that are at present 
contentious and a potential source of tension and 
dispute in the region. The introduction to the 
Guidelines, the Guidelines themselves, and a list 
of members of EEZ Group 21 are attached as 
Annexes A, B and C respectively to this paper. 
Background 
Negotiation of the EEZ regime at UNCLOS III 
was difficult and complex with widely divergent 
points of view about the status of the new zone. 
One major group, the ‘territorialists’, mainly 
comprising developing countries, saw the EEZ 
as an extension of national jurisdiction in which 
the coastal states would enjoy sovereignty 
subject to certain limitations. However, this 
position was sharply disputed by the maritime 
powers, led by the United States and the then 
Soviet Union, who saw the zone as a part of the 
high seas where coastal states had some rights 
over offshore resources. The compromise 
reached was that the EEZ should be regarded as 
a separate zone in its own right (‘sui generis’), 
which was neither high seas nor territorial sea.4
17 
Maritime Studies September-October 2005 
Now some twenty-five years later, this political 
‘tug of war’ has not gone away. The United 
States has steadfastly maintained a liberal 
interpretation of the rights and freedoms other 
states enjoy in the EEZ of a coastal state, and has 
coined the expression ‘international waters’ to 
describe collectively the high seas, the EEZ and 
the contiguous zone.5 On the other hand, some 
coastal states have sought to strengthen the 
extent of their jurisdiction over their EEZ by for 
example, claiming that other states should only 
conduct military activities in that zone with their 
consent. 
In particular, different opinions exist as to 
whether coastal state jurisdiction extends to 
hydrographic surveying and the collection of 
other marine environmental data that is not 
resource-related or is not done for scientific 
purposes.6 While the UNCLOS has established a 
clear regime for marine scientific research, there 
is no specific provision in the Convention for 
hydrographic surveying. Some coastal states 
require consent with respect to hydrographic 
surveys conducted in their EEZ by other states 
while it is the opinion of other states that 
hydrographic surveys can be conducted freely in 
the EEZ.7
The United States regards military surveying as 
similar to hydrographic surveying and thus part 
of the high seas freedoms of navigation and 
overflight and other international lawful uses of 
the sea related to those freedoms, and conducted 
with due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal state.8 The position of the United States is 
that while coastal state consent must be obtained 
in order to conduct marine scientific research in 
its EEZ, the coastal state cannot regulate 
hydrographic surveys or military surveys 
conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it 
require notification of such activities.9 Similarly, 
the United Kingdom regards Military Data 
Gathering (MDG) as a fundamental high seas 
freedom available in the EEZ.10 However, other 
states, including China, have specifically claimed 
that hydrographic surveys might only be 
conducted in their EEZs with their consent.11 In 
December 2002, China announced that it had 
enacted a new law explicitly requiring Chinese 
approval of all survey and mapping activities in 
China’s EEZ and stating that unapproved ocean-
survey activity will be subject to fines and 
confiscation of equipment and data.12
These issues are proving particularly problematic 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Large areas of this 
region are enclosed as EEZs by one country or 
another and many regional countries have large 
EEZs in which they tend to jealously protect 
their rights, particularly at a time when countries 
are paying much greater attention to the resource 
potential of their offshore areas. Furthermore, 
there are many conflicting and overlapping 
claims to maritime jurisdiction in the region and 
relatively few maritime boundaries have been 
agreed. Meanwhile, naval capabilities in the 
region are improving rapidly and increased 
attention is being given to intelligence collection 
and marine environmental research to support 
naval operations. To some extent, the EEZ 
regime has been a cause of maritime 
militarisation in the region with the protection of 
large maritime zones and marine resources, 
along with the existence of conflicting claims to 
offshore areas, often being used as justification 
for acquiring new maritime capabilities, 
including missile-armed patrol vessels and 
maritime strike aircraft. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
incidents have already occurred involving 
disputes between coastal states and other states 
over their respective rights and duties in the 
EEZ. Research vessels claiming to be conducting 
military surveys have been warned out of the 
EEZs of some coastal states, a Chinese fighter 
aircraft crashed after colliding with a US 
intelligence collection aircraft in China’s EEZ 
off Hainan in April 2001, and alleged ‘spy ships’ 
have been pursued out of Japan’s EEZ with one 
vessel even being sunk after hot pursuit into 
China’s EEZ. Coastal state legislation and 
offshore activities are beginning to conflict with 
increasing naval activities of non-coastal states in 
the region, including exercises, intelligence 
gathering and research, and their accompanying 
technological developments. 
The explanation of these disputes can be traced 
back to ambiguity in the EEZ regime, as 
established by UNCLOS, and a range of 
perspectives in Asia with regard to interpreting 
and implementing the regime. Agreement on the 
EEZ concept at UNCLOS III included many 
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compromises between coastal states and 
maritime powers resulting in intentional 
ambiguity in some of its provisions. It was 
formulated more than 25 years ago in very 
different political and technological circum-
stances than those that exist at present. Tensions 
and misunderstandings may increase unless 
some greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ 
regime is provided and agreed. 
Balance of Rights and Duties 
The basic problem with the EEZ regime lies in 
the need to find an appropriate balance between 
the rights and duties of the coastal state and those 
of other states.13 In the EEZ, coastal states have 
sovereign rights over natural resources, both 
living and non-living, and other economic 
activities, such as the production of energy from 
water currents and winds.14 They also have 
jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and 
use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; marine scientific research; and the 
protection and preservation of the marine 
environment (including the conservation of 
species), as well as other rights and duties, as 
provided for in relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS.15 However, the sovereign rights to 
marine resources gained under the EEZ regime 
are not without their costs in terms of obligations 
of the coastal state for preserving and protecting 
the marine environment and conserving species 
in the EEZ, and for having due regard to the 
rights and duties of other states in its EEZ.16
All other states have freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the EEZ, as well as the freedom to 
lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to 
those freedoms.17 However, in exercising these 
freedoms, other states are required to have due 
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal 
state.18 It has proven very difficult to define an 
operational test to distinguish between an action 
that has due regard to the rights and duties of the 
other party, and one that does not. 
A view from the United States is that the EEZ 
regime 
does not permit the coastal state to limit 
traditional non-resources related high seas 
activities in this EEZ, such as task force 
manoeuvring, flight operations, military 
exercises, telecommunications and space 
activities, intelligence and surveillance 
activities, marine data collection, and weapons’ 
testing and firing.19
Those words were written about ten years ago 
and would most likely now be qualified at least 
by recognition of the need for such activities to 
be conducted with due regard to the rights and 
duties of the coastal state. For example, 
scheduling an exercise in an area of intensive 
fishing activity declared by the coastal state, or 
in a marine park or marine protected area 
declared by the coastal state as required by 
Article 194(5) of UNCLOS,20 could be 
considered not to have due regard to the rights 
and duties of the coastal state. 
Military Activities 
The basic problem with military activities in the 
EEZ is that it is not unambiguously clear from 
UNCLOS whether military activities are 
included in the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight and other internationally lawful uses 
of the sea available under UNCLOS Articles 58 
and 87.21 The United States insists on the 
freedom of military activities in the EEZ out of 
concern that its naval and air access and mobility 
could be severely restricted by any global trend 
towards ‘thickening jurisdiction’ over the EEZ. 
The ability to conduct military activities in the 
EEZ, including military surveying and 
intelligence collection, is justified on the basis 
that they are part of the normal high seas 
freedoms of navigation and overflight that are 
available in an EEZ under UNCLOS. However, 
some coastal states, including Bangladesh, 
Malaysia, India and Pakistan, contend that other 
states cannot carry out military exercises or 
manoeuvres in or over their EEZ without their 
consent. The concern of these states is that 
uninvited military activities could threaten their 
national security or undermine their resource 
sovereignty. 
Military Surveys 
Military surveys are activities undertaken in the 
ocean and coastal waters involving marine data 
collection (whether or not classified) for military 
purposes.22 Such data is important, even 
essential, for effective submarine operations, 
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anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine warfare 
and mine countermeasures (MCM), particularly 
in waters such as the South and East China Seas 
where oceanographic and underwater acoustic 
conditions vary widely with uneven bottom 
topography, fast tidal streams and a relatively 
high level of marine life. Roach and Smith have 
observed that: 
Military surveys can include oceanographic, 
marine geological, geophysical, chemical, 
biological and acoustic data. Equipment used 
can include fathometers, swath bottom 
mappers, side scan sonars, bottom grab and 
coring systems, current meters and profilers. 
While the means of data collection used in 
military surveys may sometimes be the same as 
that used in marine scientific research, 
information from such activities, regardless of 
security classification, is intended not for use 
by the general scientific community, but by the 
military.23
Military surveying is an expression largely 
coined by the United States, but the United 
Kingdom talks about MDG in similar vein.24 
These terms are not specifically addressed by 
UNCLOS and there is no language stating or 
implying that coastal states may regulate their 
conduct in any manner outside their territorial 
sea or archipelagic waters.25 Thus the United 
States ‘reserves the right to engage in military 
surveys outside foreign territorial seas and 
archipelagic waters’, and that to ‘provide prior 
notice or request permission would create an 
adverse precedent for restrictions on mobility 
and flexibility of military survey operation’.26 
Similarly the United Kingdom believes that 
states have a right to engage in MDG anywhere 
outside foreign territorial seas and archipelagic 
waters without prior notice to, or permission 
from the coastal state. 
Some military intelligence collection activities 
conducted in the EEZ might also be considered 
as coming within the scope of ‘scientific 
research’, and thus within the scope of the 
marine scientific research regime in UNCLOS.27 
However, the United States and other maritime 
powers are strongly of the view that while these 
activities are within the scope of research, they 
are associated with the freedoms of navigation 
and overflight in the EEZ and not under the 
jurisdiction of the coastal State. Intelligence 
collection data is only used for military purposes 
and is not released for public purposes. Again the 
boundaries between ‘military surveys’ and 
‘intelligence collection’ may be difficult to 
determine, and one vessel may concurrently 
undertake both activities although the external 
appearance of the vessel (e.g. the aerials on a 
signals or electronic intelligence vessel), the 
equipment it is operating (e.g. the type of sonar), 
and its movements (e.g. whether it is 
manoeuvring, stopping or continually underway) 
should give a good lead on the nature of its data 
collection. 
Based on current and planned asset acquisitions 
in the Asia-Pacific region, military surveying and 
intelligence gathering activities in EEZs are 
going to become more controversial and more 
dangerous. In Asia, the disturbing prospects 
reflect the increasing (and changing) demands 
for technical intelligence; the robust weapons 
acquisition programs, and especially the 
increasing electronic warfare (EW) capabilities; 
and the widespread moves to develop 
Information Warfare (IW) capabilities. Regional 
countries are expanding or developing submarine 
forces and face a need to expand their 
oceanographic knowledge. The scale and scope 
of intelligence collection activities are likely to 
expand rapidly over the next decade, involving 
levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented 
in the past. They will not only become more 
intensive; they will generally be more intrusive. 
These factors all point to the importance of 
confidence-building measures such as the 
proposed Guidelines. 
Development of the Guidelines 
Process 
The EEZ Group 21 meetings were designed to 
delineate the issues and the areas of agreement 
and disagreement, and to identify and discuss 
possible voluntary guidelines for such activities 
which could reduce conflict potential. Topics 
covered included recent incidents, operational 
modalities of various navies and their rules of 
engagement, the meaning of key terms, 
initiatives to enhance maritime security, 
intelligence collection operations and EEZs, 
means and manner of implementation and 
20 
Maritime Studies September-October 2005 
enforcement of any agreed rules, options for 
resolving disagreements, and the way forward. 
The title of the meetings ‘The Regime of the 
Exclusive Economic Zone: Issues and 
Responses’ implies that they looked at the EEZ 
regime in an all-embracing fashion but this was 
not the case. The meetings focused mainly on the 
rights and duties of states with regard to the 
conduct of military activities, surveys and 
intelligence collection in the EEZs. They paid 
little attention to the host of other issues 
associated with implementing the regime, such 
as the conservation and utilisation of living 
resources and the rights of land-locked and 
geographically disadvantaged states. The main 
articles of UNCLOS addressed at the meetings 
were Articles 56, 58 and to a somewhat lesser 
extent, 59. However, they did not consider the 
full extent of the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
the coastal state in its EEZ (Article 56) or indeed, 
all the rights and duties of other States in the 
EEZ of a foreign state (Article 58). Most 
attention with the latter was on activities related 
to the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and 
operations by foreign ships and aircraft in an 
EEZ. 
Areas of Agreement 
There was agreement that the EEZ is a zone sui 
generis, and in this regard, the term 
‘international waters’ used by the United States 
was thought to be misleading. The EEZ Group 
21 agreed on the fundamental principle that 
subject to certain qualifications noted in the 
Guidelines, military vessels and aircraft have the 
right to navigate in, or fly over the EEZs of other 
states, and to engage in other internationally 
lawful uses of the sea associated with the 
operations of ships and aircraft (Guideline Va). 
However, in interpreting this and other 
principles, participants agreed on the importance 
of ‘due regard’, and that this consideration 
applies to both the coastal state and to a user 
state. There was recognition that the 
interpretation of international law is not static, 
and that the understanding of the rights and 
duties of states in the EEZ continues to evolve. 
The EEZ Group 21 agreed that the exercise of 
the freedom of navigation and overflight in and 
above EEZs should not interfere with, or 
undermine the rights or ability of coastal states to 
protect and manage their own resources and 
environment. For example, Guideline IId 
recognises that the coastal state may, on a 
temporary basis, place qualifications on the 
freedom of navigation in areas where special 
circumstances exist in its EEZ, such as major 
fishing grounds and marine protected areas, and 
that these arrangements may be made permanent 
by reference to the competent international 
organization. Similarly, Guideline Vg lists areas 
in the EEZ where military activities should not 
be conducted by another state. 
Guideline IVb recognises that maritime 
surveillance may be conducted by states for 
peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other 
states as EEZ. On military activities generally, 
Guideline Vb recognises the principle that ships 
and aircraft of a state undertaking military 
activities in the EEZ of another state have the 
obligations to use the ocean for peaceful 
purposes only, and to refrain from the threat or 
use of force, or provocative acts, such as 
stimulating or exciting the defensive systems of 
the coastal state; collecting information to 
support the use of force against the coastal state; 
or establishing a ‘sea base’ within another state’s 
EEZ without its consent. The avoidance of 
interference between the electronic systems of 
the coastal state and ships and aircraft exercising 
their freedoms of navigation and overflight is 
covered by Guideline VI. 
In reaching consensus that hydrographic 
surveying in an EEZ should not be conducted 
without the consent of the coastal state 
(Guideline IXa), the EEZ Group 21 appreciated 
the many changes since UNCLOS III with the 
practice and technology of hydrographic 
surveying and the utility of hydrographic data.28 
Apart from navigational safety, important 
applications of hydrographic knowledge include 
planning the exploration and exploitation of 
marine resources, the determination of seaward 
limits of national jurisdiction, coastal zone 
management, national development (including 
building new ports and harbours), and the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries.29 Coastal 
state consent for hydrographic surveying should 
normally be granted unless the surveys fall 
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within one of the consent categories in 
UNCLOS Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb). 
There was agreement that the exercise of the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ 
should not be for the purpose of marine scientific 
research without coastal state consent, subject 
only to the principle of ‘implied consent’ set out 
in UNCLOS Article 252. However, coastal state 
consent for hydrographic surveying should 
normally be granted unless the surveys fall 
within one of the consent categories in UNCLOS 
Article 246(5) (Guideline IXb). 
Areas of Disagreement 
Areas of disagreement during the meetings 
generally related to the meaning of terms in the 
Convention as well as to the meaning of specific 
articles. For example, there are specific 
differences with regard to the meaning of 
‘freedom’ of navigation and overflight in and 
above the EEZ, i.e. whether this freedom can be 
limited by certain regulations by the coastal state, 
or whether such freedoms are absolute. 
There are different interpretations regarding the 
precise meaning of the Convention’s phrase 
allowing ‘other internationally lawful uses’ of 
the sea in the EEZ,30 and the nature of the 
military activities that this phrase might include. 
The interpretation of this phrase can in turn be 
affected by the interpretation of such terms as 
‘due regard’, ‘abuse of rights’, ‘peaceful 
purposes’,31 and the obligation not to threaten or 
use force against other states. In this context, 
questions arise as to whether some military and 
intelligence gathering activities are a lawful 
exercise of the freedom of navigation and 
overflight, whether they are an abuse of rights, 
whether they pay ‘due regard’ to the interests of 
the coastal state, and whether they are a threat to 
the peace and security of the coastal state. 
There is a considerable range of opinion 
regarding the meaning of ‘due regard’. Some 
countries, e.g. the United States, interpret ‘due 
regard’ as requiring any user state to refrain from 
activities that unreasonably interfere with the 
exercise of the rights of the coastal state. 
However, others like China, for example, appear 
to interpret ‘due regard’ as requiring foreign 
users of the EEZ to refrain from activities which 
endanger the sovereignty, security and national 
interest of the coastal state. An interpretation 
applicable to many cases would be whether the 
activity interferes with the rights and interests of 
the other state. But there is no agreement as to 
what constitutes such rights and interests, 
whether the interference must be unreasonable, 
and whether it must be actual or potential. 
There is also disagreement on how to deal with 
these uncertainties. But leaving the problem 
unresolved could be dangerous. Incidents are 
occurring more frequently and even if bilateral 
arrangements are agreed, their rules may differ 
depending on the countries and circumstances. 
The majority of EEZ Group 21 participants 
shared the concern that national governments 
may deal with these matters unilaterally in order 
to protect their security and other interests. If 
numerous coastal states were to enact unilateral 
national legislation prohibiting the exercise of 
military and intelligence gathering activities in 
and above their EEZ, then the prohibition against 
conducting such exercises could become part of 
customary international law through state 
practice, despite the opposition of some 
countries, particularly if those countries are not 
parties to UNCLOS. 
Failing the unlikely resolution of these issues by 
the International Court of Justice or the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, 
these disputes will be addressed through a 
chaotic and disorderly process whereby countries 
assert and defend their positions through state 
practice, followed by protests by countries that 
disagree, and eventually by the give and take of 
diplomatic negotiations. It is in this context of 
avoiding unilateralism that may lead to conflict 
and of providing a common basis for bilateral 
and multilateral agreements that this dialogue 
and the Guidelines were developed. 
Conclusion 
Much has changed over the last 25 years and 
international law is still evolving with regard to 
the implementation of the EEZ regime. The 
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the 
EEZ produced by the EEZ Group 21 are 
intended to contribute to more effective 
implementation of the regime and improved 
oceans management generally. They recognise 
the general principle that military activities in the 
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EEZ, including military surveying and 
intelligence collection, are part of the freedoms 
of navigation, overflight, and engagement in 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
associated with the operations of ships and 
aircraft. However, the Guidelines also recognise 
that these freedoms are not absolute and must be 
conducted with ‘due regard’ to the rights and 
obligations of the coastal state in its EEZ. The 
Guidelines are intended to assist in clarifying 
what might be considered as not having ‘due 
regard’ to the rights and duties of the various 
parties. 
Copies of the EEZ Group 21 Guidelines are now 
to be distributed at a regional and international 
level. At the regional level, distribution will 
include APEC, the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), the 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific (CSCAP), and the Western Pacific Naval 
Symposium (WPNS).32 At the international level, 
they will be sent to the UN Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, the International 
Maritime Organization, and the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. Individual 
members of the EEZ Group 21 have been asked 




Introduction to the Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
Introduction 
This document puts forward proposed ‘Guidelines for 
Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ)’ developed by a group of senior officials and 
analysts primarily from countries of the Asia-Pacific region 
participating in their personal capacities in a series of 
meetings held from 2002-2005.* The Guidelines are a set 
of non-binding, voluntary principles which provide the 
basis for a common understanding and approach to issues 
arising from the implementation of the EEZ regime, 
particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The principles are 
based on the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(the 1982 UNCLOS), state practice, and emerging ‘soft’ 
law. 
Misunderstandings regarding military activities in foreign 
EEZs have become all too common. Major incidents 
include the March 2001 confrontation between the US 
Navy survey vessel Bowditch and a Chinese frigate in 
China’s EEZ; the April 2001 collision between a US EP3 
surveillance plane and a Chinese jet fighter over China’s 
EEZ; the December 2001 Japanese Coast Guard pursuit of 
and firing at a North Korean spy vessel in its and China’s 
EEZ; and Vietnam’s protest against Chinese live fire 
exercises in Vietnam’s claimed EEZ. Navies are expanding 
and technology is advancing while coastal states are 
placing increasing importance on control over their EEZs. 
These opposing trends will result in a higher frequency and 
intensity of such incidents. 
Other factors contribute to the problem. The scale and 
scope of maritime and airborne intelligence collection 
activities is becoming more intensive and intrusive. They 
                                                 
* Bali (June 2002), Tokyo (February 2003), Honolulu 
(December 2003), Shanghai (October 2004), and 
Tokyo (September 2005). 
generate tension and produce defensive reactions and 
escalatory dynamics. And new threats like trade in 
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, piracy, and 
smuggling of arms, drugs and humans encourage both 
coastal and maritime states to extend their control or 
surveillance beyond their territorial seas, in some cases to 
others’ EEZs. Further, given the myriad boundary disputes 
and overlapping claims in the region, it is not always clear 
where one nation’s jurisdiction ends and another’s begins. 
Confusion and differences of opinion regarding the regime 
governing military activities in the EEZ further 
complicates the issue. 
Agreement on the EEZ concept included many 
compromises between coastal states and maritime powers 
resulting in intentional ambiguity in some of its provisions. 
It was formulated more than 25 years ago in very different 
political and technological circumstances than those that 
exist at present. The ambiguities and lack of clarity should 
be examined in the light of these changed circumstances 
and evolving state practice with a view to reaching agreed 
interpretation. 
Importance of These Guidelines 
These Guidelines are important for three main reasons. The 
first is the complexity of the Asian maritime environment 
with its unique combination of maritime geography, large 
areas of claimed EEZ, and many conflicting and 
overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. Second, recent 
incidents indicate that there is considerable ambiguity and 
range of perspective in Asia with regard to the EEZ 
regime, particularly the rights and duties of the coastal state 
vis-à-vis those of user states. Third, coastal state legislation 
and offshore activities are beginning to conflict with 
increasing naval activities of non-coastal states in the 
region, including exercises, intelligence gathering and 
research, and their accompanying technological 
developments. Tensions and misunderstandings may 
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increase unless greater clarity and awareness of the EEZ 
regime are provided and agreed. 
Purpose of the Guidelines 
The Guidelines serve three main purposes: 
• First, they assist in clarifying the rights and duties of 
both coastal states and user states and certain 
terminology with regard to the activities that might be 
undertaken in an EEZ by foreign ships and aircraft. 
• Second, the Guidelines constitute an important 
regional confidence-building measure providing 
general principles for activities that some states 
currently regard as contentious. 
• Third, they will contribute to more effective oceans 
management in the region through improved 
understanding and more effective implementation of 
the EEZ regime. 
Legal Status 
The proposed Guidelines are non-binding in nature. They 
set out broad principles of common understanding 
regarding military and intelligence gathering activities in 
the EEZ but do not create legally binding obligations 
between states. In keeping with their non-binding nature, 
the Guidelines are framed in exhortatory rather than 
obligatory language. 
The Guidelines may be generally regarded as reflecting the 
need for better understanding of the rights and obligations 
of states conducting activities in the EEZ of another 
country. They represent a consensus among the 
participants on issues that are at present contentious and a 
potential source of tension and dispute in the region. 
 
ANNEX B 
Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
PREAMBLE 
Participants in the Dialogue on ‘The Regime of the 
EEZ: Issues and Responses’: 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace 
and security and the promotion of friendly relations 
between States;  
Recognizing that the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (the 1982 UNCLOS) establishes a new 
regime for the seas and oceans which balances fairly the 
interests of all States; 
Affirming the duty of all States to utilize the oceans for 
peaceful purposes as stipulated in the 1982 UNCLOS 
Article 301; 
Acknowledging the obligation of all States to preserve and 
protect the marine environment; 
Considering that the EEZ is neither high seas nor territorial 
sea and is subject to a specific legal regime under the 1982 
UNCLOS; 
Desiring to ensure the safety and security of navigation in 
the EEZ; 
Recognizing the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the 
coastal State in the EEZ as provided in Article 56 of the 
1982 UNCLOS; 
Recognizing the rights and duties of other States in the EEZ 
as provided in Article 58 of the 1982 UNCLOS; 
Recognizing a need for balance between the rights and 
duties of a coastal State in its EEZ and the rights and duties 
of other States; 
Mindful that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction exercised 
by a coastal State in its EEZ differ from the sovereignty it 
exercises in its internal waters, archipelagic waters (if any), 
and territorial sea; 
Recognizing that Article 300 of the 1982 UNCLOS 
prohibits the abuse of rights, jurisdiction and freedoms 
recognized under the Convention; 
Acknowledging the importance of resolving disputes by 
peaceful means; and  
Convinced that these Guidelines will promote 
understanding of the rights and duties of States conducting 
military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ of 
another State, and thus contribute to peace, good order, and 
security at sea, particularly in the Asia Pacific region; 
Hereby recommend the following non-binding Guidelines 
for Navigation and Overflight in the EEZ. 
I.  DEFINITIONS 
a. For the purposes of these Guidelines:  
1. ‘abuse of rights’ means the unnecessary or 
arbitrary exercise of rights, jurisdiction and 
freedoms, or interference with the exercise of 
rights by another State, or the abuse or misuse 
of powers by a State causing injury to another 
State; 
2. ‘exclusive economic zone’ means an area 
referred to as such in relevant Articles of the 
1982 UNCLOS; 
3. ‘hydrographic survey’ means a survey having 
for its principal purpose the determination of 
data relating to bodies of water. A hydrographic 
survey may consist of the determination of one 
or several of the following classes of data: 
depth of water, configuration and nature of the 
seabed; directions and force of currents; heights 
and times of tides and water stages; and 
location of topographic features and fixed 
objects for survey and navigation purposes; 
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4. ‘marine environment’ is the physical , 
chemical, geological and biological 
components, conditions and factors which 
interact and determine the productivity, state, 
condition and quality of the marine ecosystem, 
the waters of the seas and the oceans and the 
airspace above those waters, as well as the 
seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof;  
5. ‘marine scientific research’ means activities 
undertaken in the marine environment to 
enhance scientific knowledge regarding the 
nature and natural processes of the seas and 
oceans, the seabed and subsoil; 
6. ‘military activities’ means the operations of 
military vessels, aircraft and devices, including 
intelligence gathering, exercises, trials, training, 
and weapons practices; 
7. ‘military surveys’ refers to activities undertaken 
in the marine environment involving data 
collection for military purposes; 
8. ‘peaceful uses/purposes’ in the context of the 
EEZ means that uses of that zone, or the 
purposes of activities conducted therein or 
thereabove, must not threaten or use force; 
9. ‘surveillance’ means the observation by visual 
or any technical means of activities on, over or 
under the seas and oceans; and 
10. ‘threat of force’ means a coercive attempt to 
compel another State to take or not to take 
certain specific action, or an action that is 
directed against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of that State, or against 
any of its assets or people, or taken in any other 
manner inconsistent with the UN Charter. 
II.  RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE COASTAL 
STATE 
a. A coastal State may, in accordance with inter-
national law, regulate navigation in its EEZ by ships 
carrying inherently dangerous or noxious 
substances in their cargo. 
b. The coastal State should have due regard for other 
States’ freedoms of navigation and overflight and of 
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to 
these freedoms, such as those associated with the 
operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables 
and pipelines. 
c. Each State using another State’s EEZ should ensure 
that its vessels and aircraft with sovereign 
immunity, act, as far as is reasonable and 
practicable, in a manner consistent with the 1982 
UNCLOS. 
d. In recognition of its rights and obligations with 
regard to the management of the marine 
environment and marine living and non-living 
resources, the coastal State may, on a temporary 
basis, place qualifications on the freedom of 
navigation in areas with special circumstances in its 
EEZ, such as major fishing grounds and marine 
protected areas. These arrangements may be made 
permanent by reference to the competent 
international organization. 
e. Any restriction on navigation and overflight 
imposed by a coastal State in its EEZ due to its 
weapons tests and exercises, or any other 
operational activity, should be temporary, in 
specified areas only, and only if such suspension is 
essential for the carrying out of such tests and 
exercises.  
III.   RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF OTHER STATES 
a. While exercising the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight in an EEZ, States should avoid activities 
that unreasonably prejudice the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State. 
b. States’ exercise of the freedoms of navigation and 
overflight should not interfere with or endanger the 
rights of the coastal State to protect and manage its 
own resources and their environment. 
c. The exercise by other States of the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight should not interfere with 
the rights of the coastal State with regard to its 
establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations and structures in its EEZ. 
IV.  MARITIME SURVEILLANCE 
a. The right of a coastal State to conduct maritime 
surveillance in its EEZ should not be impeded by 
other States exercising their rights in that zone.  In 
this context, the foreign State must have due regard 
to the rights and duties of the coastal State. 
b. Maritime surveillance may be conducted by States 
for peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other 
States as EEZ. This surveillance should not 
prejudice the jurisdictional rights and 
responsibilities of the coastal State within its EEZ. 
c. States should develop arrangements for the sharing 
of surveillance information with coastal States. 
V.  MILITARY ACTIVITIES 
a. With the exception of the qualifications noted 
elsewhere in these guidelines, military vessels and 
aircraft have the right to navigate in, or fly over the 
EEZs of other States, and to engage in other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea associated 
with the operations of ships and aircraft.  
b. Ships and aircraft of a State undertaking military 
activities in the EEZ of another State have the 
obligation to use the ocean for peaceful purposes 
only, and to refrain from the threat or use of force, 
or provocative acts, such as stimulating or exciting 
the defensive systems of the coastal State; collecting 
information to support the use of force against the 
coastal State; or establishing a ‘sea base’ within 
another State’s EEZ without its consent. The user 
State should have due regard for the rights of others 
to use the sea including the coastal State and 
comply with its obligations under international law. 
c. Warships or aircraft of a State intending to carry out 
a major military exercise in the EEZ of another 
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State should inform the coastal State and others 
through a timely navigational warning of the time, 
date and areas involved in the exercise, and if 
possible, invite observers from the coastal State to 
witness the exercise.  
d. Military activities in the EEZ of other States should 
not hamper the search and rescue operations of the 
coastal State in its EEZ. States should co-operate in 
any such search and rescue operations. 
e. Military activities by a State in the EEZ of another 
State should not involve the deployment of systems 
that prejudice the defense or security of the coastal 
State, or interfere with or endanger the right of the 
coastal State to protect and manage its resources 
and environment. 
f. Military activities of a State in the EEZs of other 
States should not cause pollution or negatively 
affect the marine environment or marine living 
resources, including mammals. In particular, if 
prohibited by the laws of the coastal State, such  
activities in a coastal State’s EEZ should not 
involve live weapons fire, underwater explosions or 
creation of sound waves and dangerous or 
radioactive materials that may directly or indirectly 
harm marine life or cause marine pollution. 
g. Military activities by another State should not be 
conducted: 
1) in areas which have been announced by the 
coastal State as temporarily closed for the 
purposes of safety of navigation and overflight; 
2) in areas with intensive fishing activities 
declared by the coastal State; 
3) in areas with special circumstances adopted in 
accordance with Article 211 (6)(a) of the 1982 
UNCLOS; 
4) in marine parks or marine protected areas 
declared by the coastal State as required by 
Article 194 (5) of the 1982 UNCLOS; 
5) in areas with intensive navigation and near sea 
lanes and traffic separation schemes; and 
6) near submarine cables and pipelines on the 
seabed of the EEZ clearly marked by the 
coastal State on large-scale charts recognized 
by the coastal State. 
h. If there are high seas immediately adjacent to the 
coastal State’s EEZ, a State undertaking military 
exercises should make every possible effort to limit 
them to the high seas. 
VI.  NON-INTERFERENCE WITH ELECTRONIC 
SYSTEMS 
a. The activities of another State in the EEZ of a 
coastal State should not interfere with the 
communications, computer, and electronic systems 
of the coastal State, or make broadcasts that 
adversely affect the defense or security of the 
coastal State. 
b. The coastal State should not interfere with the 
communications, computer, and electronic systems 
of vessels or aircraft of another State exercising its 
freedoms of navigation or overflight in or over the 
coastal State’s EEZ. 
c. In order to make subparagraphs a and b effective, 
States should conclude agreements regarding 
mutual non-interference with communications, 
computer and electronic systems.  
VII.  SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY AND OTHER 
UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES 
a. Ships in an EEZ are subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of their flag State, except in 
circumstances provided by the 1982 UNCLOS or 
other international treaties. 
b. States may act in an EEZ of another State to seize a 
pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by 
piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest 
the persons and seize the property onboard. 
c. To suppress terrorism and illicit traffic in drugs, 
persons, arms, and weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), their delivery systems, and related 
materials, States should: 
1. board and search any vessel flying their flag in 
their EEZ that is reasonably suspected of 
transporting terrorists or being engaged in illicit 
traffic in drugs, persons, arms, and WMD, their 
delivery systems, or related materials, and seize 
such cargoes that are identified as such; and 
2. consent, under appropriate circumstances, to 
the boarding and search of their own flag 
vessels by other States, and to the seizure of 
terrorists or drugs, persons, arms, and WMD-
related cargoes on such vessels that may be 
mutually identified as such by both States. 
d. The boarding and search of a foreign flag vessel in 
an EEZ without the consent of the flag State is not 
justified solely because it is suspected of illegal 
trafficking in WMD, their delivery systems, or 
related materials.  
e. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels in 
the EEZ of a coastal State, the arresting vessel 
should through appropriate channels inform the 
coastal State of the action taken. 
VIII.  MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
a. Coastal State consent should in normal 
circumstances be granted for marine scientific 
research conducted exclusively for peaceful 
purposes and in order to increase scientific 
knowledge of the marine environment for the 
benefit of all humanity. 
b. Marine scientific research that has direct use for 
living and non-living resource exploration and 
exploitation, conservation and management is 
entirely under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, 
which is not obliged to grant consent to such 
research by foreign vessels. 
c. Overflight by manned or unmanned aircraft of one 
State over the EEZ of another State should not be 
conducted for the purpose of marine scientific 
research without the consent of the coastal State. 
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d. States should fulfill their obligations to provide 
information to the coastal State in accordance with 
the 1982 UNCLOS Article 248, and to comply with 
certain conditions in the 1982 UNCLOS Article 
249, particularly with regard to the participation of 
the coastal State in marine scientific research 
projects. 
IX.  HYDROGRAPHIC SURVEYING 
a. Hydrographic surveying should only be conducted 
in the EEZ of another State with the consent of the 
coastal State.  This does not apply to the collection 
of navigational data by a ship required for safe 
navigation during the ship’s passage through an 
EEZ.  
b. Coastal State consent for hydrographic surveying 
should normally be granted unless the surveys fall 
within one of the consent categories in the 1982 
UNCLOS Article 246(5). 
c. The Guidelines in Articles VIII and IX also apply to 
aircraft, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), 
remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and other 
remotely operated devices of a State conducting 
research or collecting data in an EEZ. 
X.  TRANSPARENCY OF LEGISLATION 
a. Those States with policies and/or legislation 
regarding military activities in their EEZs should 
make them as transparent and as widely known as 
possible, including to the military authorities of 
other States that are frequently using or navigating 
their EEZs. 
b. The dissemination or the receipt of the legislation 
by other States should not and does not constitute 
recognition of or refusal thereof by the receiving 
States of the legality of the legislation, unless 
specifically so stated by the receiving States or 
authorities. 
c. A copy of those laws should also be deposited with 
the UN Secretary-General, and be made available 
for easy reference by any interested States, 
authorities, or persons, with a view to increasing 
transparency and mitigating any hostile intentions. 
d. Military vessels and aircraft of a State exercising the 
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ of 
another State should observe and comply with the 
coastal State’s legislation on the basis of goodwill, 
or comply under protest.  
e. Where States disagree, dialogue should be initiated 
either at the bilateral or regional level.  
XI.  NON-PREJUDICIAL CLAUSE 
a. Nothing contained in these Guidelines, or activities 
taking place pursuant to them, should be interpreted 
as prejudicing the position of any State in its claims 
to sovereign rights or jurisdiction in its claimed 
EEZ, or its rights and responsibilities therein under 
the 1982 UNCLOS. 
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